In re: Marrett

What the court wrote

Verbatim from the court's document (public domain). Ellipses mark omitted text; nothing is paraphrased.

B. Count I: “Fraud on the Court” In Count I, the Complaint alleges that Kennedy-Jensen, Here, Count I fails to state a claim upon which relief can Souza, and Druary (the “Count I Defendants”)31 committed be granted because none of the alleged conduct occurred fraud on the court by “submitting fabricated orders, before this Court. See King, 790 F. Supp. 3d at 35 n.1; false employer affiliations, and unserved pleadings; by Beaulieu, 2014 WL 4843809, at *10 n.5. Additionally, none misrepresenting docket entries; and by working with clerks of the allegations relating to conduct that occurred in federal to suppress filings and reroute the case without proper court in the District of Maine — namely that the case was authority.”32 The Debtors argue that events in the United removed to federal court; that Souza appeared as counsel States District Court for the District of Maine, including the in federal court; that Druary electronically filed on the filing of the state court order denying leave to amend the docket a copy of the state court's order denying leave to counterclaim on the federal docket, sufficiently demonstrates amend; and that the case was remanded to state court — are fraud on the court and therefore this Court should set “egregious,” Bogosian, 2017 WL 9324764, at *8, describe aside the state court Foreclosure Judgment. The Count I “an unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the Defendants argue that the claim should be dismissed because judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter the Complaint fails to assert any legal basis for this claim. involving an officer of the court,” id., or constitute actions that would “seriously affect[ ] the integrity of the normal Federal Rule 60(d)(3) permits a federal court to “set aside process of adjudication,” Torres, 914 F.3d at 19. Entering a judgment for fraud on the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d) an appearance or filing documents on a docket, even if (3). However, the First Circuit does not recognize fraud fabricated, false, and unserved, as the Complaint asserts, is on the court as an independent cause of action except in insufficient to meet the applicable standard. The remaining rare circumstances. See, e.g., Bogosian v. R.I. Airport Corp. conduct alleged in the Complaint occurred in state court, not (T.F. Green Airport), C.A. No. 17-16S, 2017 WL 9324764, federal court. See Cline v. Burke, 682 F. Supp. 3d 125, 134 at *8 (D.R.I. May 3, 2017); Shirokov v. Dunlap, Grubb & (D. Mass. 2023), aff'd, No. 23-1680, 2024 WL 5412394 (1st Weaver, PLLC, Civil Action No. 10-12043-GAO, 2012 WL Cir. Oct. 16, 2024) (dismissing claim because, inter alia, “the 1065578, at *30 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2012). “[A] claim of alleged fraud appear[ed] to have been committed on [a state fraud o[n] the court may be sustained as an independent court], not a federal court”). Accordingly, Count I will be action only if the issue raised is ‘egregious’ and involves DISMISSED. ‘an unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the

Authorities cited in the passage: Goguen v. Nason, 419 A.2d 1032 (Me. 1980) · filings of · Debtors cited 'Goguen v. Nason · Ridgway v. Prudential Ins. Co · Bogosian v. R.I. Airport Corp. conduct alleged in the Complaint occurred in state court · See Cline v. Burke · Shirokov v. Dunlap · Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)