Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc.

What the court wrote

Verbatim from the court's document (public domain). Ellipses mark omitted text; nothing is paraphrased.

To the extent Defendants seek production of “all documents and information concerning her use of third-party AI tools in connection with this lawsuit, as requested in Defendants’ discovery requests,” this request is DENIED, as the information sought is not discoverable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A) (“Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by another party or its representative ….”) (emphases added). Moreover, it is not relevant, or, even if marginally relevant, is not proportional. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). ... Even if this information were discoverable, it is subject to protection under the work-product doctrine, which Plaintiff is permitted to assert. ... Moreover, to the extent Defendants argue that Plaintiff waived the work-product protection by using ChatGPT, the work-product waiver has to be a waiver to an adversary or in a way likely to get in an adversary’s hand. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Pracs. Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 306 n.28 (6th Cir. 2002) ... And ChatGPT (and other generative AI programs) are tools, not persons, even if they may have administrators somewhere in the background.

Authorities cited in the passage: Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A) · Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) · Anderson v. Furst, No. 2:17-12676, 2019 WL 2284731 (E.D. Mich. May 29, 2019) · In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litigation, 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002) · Schanfield v. Sojitz Corp. of America, 258 F.R.D. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) · United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980)