Morgan v. Jones

What the court wrote

Verbatim from the court's document (public domain). Ellipses mark omitted text; nothing is paraphrased.

Morgan suggests that these phantom cases may be artifacts from the use of generative artificial-intelligence (“AI”) software drawing upon large language models. Appellate courts across Ohio and the country have experienced a surge of filings with such “hallucinations”—i.e., false citations proffered as true by generative AI. Jones neither confirms nor denies the allegation that he relied on AI; he merely states that the bogus cases “were the result of [his] chasing case law threads from other cases and not keeping close track of the situation.” We are inclined to agree with Morgan: Jones’s citations bear the hallmarks of AI hallucinations. No part of either citation refers to a real case remotely related to the proposition for which it is cited. If Jones had real cases in mind, he surely would have provided them in his opposition to Morgan’s motion. And if Jones had fabricated his bogus cases the old-fashioned way, we doubt he would have opted for an odd, three-party caption like “City of Columbus v. Edwards-Bosh v. Tri-County Toyota.” This court now has a rule about the use of AI. See Loc.R. 45. In it, we make clear that attorneys and parties using generative AI “are responsible for ensuring that all legal arguments, factual assertions, evidence, and citations are accurate, relevant, and comply with applicable laws, procedural rules, and ethical obligations,” and that the submission of “inaccurate, misleading, or fabricated AI-generated content” may result in “strik[ing] the filing and/or impos[ing] sanctions on the attorney or party.” Loc.R. 45(B) and (C). But Loc.R. 45 was not in place when Jones filed his brief. The use of fabricated citations is clearly a breach of a party’s responsibilities to the court. But our general sanctions rule, Loc.R. 23(A), focuses on whether “an appeal, original action, or motion is frivolous or is prosecuted for delay, harassment, or any other improper purpose.” The submission of a brief containing AI hallucinations does not inherently fit these descriptions. In the end, we have discretion to determine whether sanctions are warranted in a particular case. Although we could sanction Jones under our inherent authority, we choose not to do so because (1) we had not yet promulgated Loc.R. 45 when Jones filed the offending brief, and (2) a limited number of his citations (only two) were to “phantom” cases.

Authorities cited in the passage: Ohio First District Loc.R. 45 · Ohio First District Loc.R. 23(A) · Gamble v. Gamble, 2025-Ohio-2381 · Coleman, 2026-Ohio-965 · Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610 (2d Cir. 2024) · Garces v. Hernandez, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21220 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2025) · Moore v. Del City, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 31411 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025) · Shahid v. Esaam, 376 Ga. App. 145 (2025) · In re S.M., 2025 IL App (4th) 250277-U · Williams v. Kirch, 268 N.E.3d 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) · Kruse v. Karlen, 692 S.W.3d 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024)