Arron v. Custer

What the court wrote

Verbatim from the court's document (public domain). Ellipses mark omitted text; nothing is paraphrased.

Likewise, the Complaint does not appear to be attacking a state-court judgment so as to implicate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Beyond a vague reference to “court proceedings” (Compl, ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID # 3), Ms. Arron has not alleged the existence of any specific state judicial decision that she wants the Court to overturn.2 See, e.g., HPIL Holding, Inc. v. Zhang, 168 F.4th 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2026) (“Rooker and Feldman apply only to attempts to directly reverse a state court’s judgment.”) (emphasis added); cf. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284 (referencing “the narrow ground occupied by Rooker-Feldman”). 2 If it is found that such a state-court case does exist, however, reconsideration of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may become appropriate. Even assuming that there was some qualifying state-court custody determination, the source of Ms. Arron’s injury is not that determination but rather Defendants’ allegedly improper conduct of detaining her, seizing her children without a warrant, and preventing her from being heard. (See Compl., ECF No. ... Arron’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and recommends dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction of Ms. Arron’s requested relief in the form of the “immediate reunification with [her] children” (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID # 4). The Court further DENIES Ms. Aaron’s motion for a TRO (ECF No. 1-2). The Court otherwise REJECTS the OR&R and accordingly RECOMMITS the remainder of Ms. Arron’s Complaint to the Magistrate Judge for a further screening determination under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). IT IS SO ORDERED. /s/ Sarah D. Morrison SARAH D.

Authorities cited in the passage: Inc. v. Zhang, 168 F