Courts on AI / evidence / rules
Canada Evidence Act section 31.1
Electronic-document authentication rule · rule
Status as of
In force
“Any person seeking to admit an electronic document as evidence has the burden of proving its authenticity.” — source
Canada Evidence Act section 31.1 is not AI-specific, but it supplies the authentication burden repeatedly applied in Canadian deepfake and digital-evidence cases. It requires proof capable of supporting a finding that an electronic document is what it purports to be.
Operative text
Any person seeking to admit an electronic document as evidence has the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic document is that which it is purported to be.
Short verbatim extract (≤25 words); the instrument is linked below.
Decisions that cite it
- R v FlettCourt of King's Bench of Alberta · 2026-04-17 · admitted
The Crown tendered three Snapchat story videos showing men in a vehicle and a handgun. Defence counsel invoked AI and deepfakes, but the court relied on contemporaneous police viewing, screen recordings, timestamps, matched occupants, and a seized gun to admit the clips and treat manipulation concerns as weight issues.
- Head v. DoeSupreme Court of British Columbia · 2026-02-04 · admitted
Mr. Head challenged a GoPro accident video with an online AI-tool printout saying deepfake detected. The court accepted witness evidence about the camera and SD card plus forensic analysis of metadata and frame continuity, rejected the unsupported AI-tool output, relied on the video, and dismissed the claim.
- R. v. MedowOntario Court of Justice · 2025-12-11 · admitted
The accused alleged police body-worn and in-car camera videos were digitally altered deepfakes. The court took notice of deepfake technology but accepted officer testimony that the footage accurately depicted events, found no evidentiary support for manipulation, admitted the recordings, and convicted the accused.
- R. v. ChengOntario Court of Justice · 2025-05-07 · admitted
Cheng challenged a home-surveillance video and screenshot as possibly altered or misdated. The court accepted testimony from the former partner and daughter that the files came from the system’s SIM card and were uploaded unchanged, found the gap explainable, admitted the exhibits, and convicted him.
- R. v. VitellaroOntario Court of Justice · 2025-04-11 · admitted
Vitellaro alleged a police booking-cell video was altered and called it a CGI deepfake. In court, the parties compared three USB copies, including the alleged original, and the judge inspected the footage, found the copies consistent, and rejected the authenticity challenge.
- Paynter v. Canada Border Services AgencyFederal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board · 2024-08-19 · admitted
Paynter contended CCTV footage of a workplace entrance altercation was a deepfake. The Board reviewed the video alongside security incident reports, an investigator’s report, timestamps, and witness testimony, found the allegation unsupported, relied on the footage, and denied the grievances challenging discipline and termination.
- Azubuike c. R.Superior Court of Québec · 2024-05-09 · excluded
The accused alleged eight customer-service recordings were voice clones and offered a proposed expert. After a voir dire, the court found the expert unqualified and excluded his report and testimony, while leaving the recordings’ ultimate authenticity to be addressed through other evidence.
- R v MDCourt of King's Bench of Alberta · 2024-02-22 · admitted
The complainant offered a cellphone recording of an inculpatory porch conversation. Defence suggested the male voice had been cloned. After a voir dire, the judge relied on the complainant’s evidence, voice comparison, and contextual fit, rejected AI fabrication, admitted the recording, and convicted.